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Abstract
The U.S. Census Bureau has the responsibility to release high quality data products while
maintaining the confidentiality promised to all respondents under Title 13 of the U.S. Code. This
paper describes a Microdata Analysis System (MAS) that is currently under development, which
will allow users to receive certain statistical analyses of Census Bureau data, such as cross-
tabulations and regressions, without ever having access to the data themselves. Such analyses
must satisfy several statistical confidentiality rules; those that fail these rules will not be output
to the user. In addition, the Drop q Rule, which requires removing a relatively small number of
units before performing an analysis, is applied to all datasets. We describe the confidentiality
rules and briefly outline an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Drop q Rule. We conclude with
a description of other approaches to creating a system of this sort, and some directions for future
research.
MSC: 62P20, 62Q05, 68P20
Keywords: Statistical disclosure limitation, Microdata analysis, Information retrieval, Cross-tabu-
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1. Introduction
The U.S. Census Bureau collects its survey and census data under Title 13 of the U.S.
Code, which prevents the Census Bureau from releasing any data “. . . whereby the data
furnished by any particular establishment or individual under this title can be identified.”
In addition to Title 13, the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency
Act of 2002 (CIPSEA) requires the protection of information collected or acquired for
exclusively statistical purposes under a pledge of confidentiality. However, the agency
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also has the responsibility of releasing data for the purpose of statistical analysis. In
common with most national statistical institutes, our goal is to release as much high
quality data as possible without violating the pledge of confidentiality, as described in
Duncan et al. (2001) and Kaufman et al. (2005).
This paper discusses a Microdata Analysis System (MAS) that is under development
at the U.S. Census Bureau. Much of the framework for the system was described in
Steel and Reznek (2005) and Steel (2006). The system is designed to allow data users
to perform various statistical analyses (regressions, cross-tabulations, correlation coeffi-
cients, etc.) on confidential survey and census microdata without seeing or downloading
the underlying microdata.
In Section 2, we give some background on the MAS and the motivation for its devel-
opment. In Section 3, we discuss the current state of the prototype system, including its
capabilities and the rules that protect confidentiality. In Section 4, we briefly summarize
a study of the effectiveness of the Drop q Rule, one of the disclosure avoidance mea-
sures taken within the system. In Section 5, we examine some other approaches to the
problem of creating a remote access system such as the MAS. In Section 6, we conclude
with remarks on future research and the further development of the system.
2. Background on the MAS
The Census Bureau conducts reidentification studies on our public use microdata files.
In these studies, we attempt to link our public use files to external files that contain
identifiers. It is reasonable to expect that with more publicly available data and expanded
use of data mining tools, there will be an increase in the number and complexity of
confidentiality threats. There is some concern that in order to meet the confidentiality
requirements under which the Census Bureau operates, we may have to reduce the detail
available in our data products and use more perturbation techniques to protect them, thus
degrading the quality of the data.
This problem of data confidentiality—at the Census Bureau and other statistical
agencies around the world—has motivated the creation of remote access systems which
allow the user to request a statistical analysis and receive the result without having direct
access to the underlying microdata. Common to almost all remote access systems is that
the ability to receive desired results is not absolute: in some instances, the result might
be based on perturbed data, and most proposals for remote access systems include the
rejection of some queries to preserve confidentiality. The idea of a remote access sys-
tem goes back at least to Keller-McNulty and Unger (1998), although the concept of
allowing customized queries was proposed much earlier; see the description of the Geo-
graphically Referenced Data Storage and Retrieval System in Fellegi et al. (1969). Fel-
legi (1972) anticipates the need to screen the query results to ensure that confidentiality
is adequately protected. Adam and Worthmann (1989) describe several restrictions on
systems that release counts of numbers of people with particular characteristics. These
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include suppressing counts if the numbers are too close to 0 or to the full size of the
database; requiring that multiple queries from the same user have only limited overlap;
and keeping a log of each user’s queries and checking each new query against the log
to verify nondisclosure. However, they acknowledge that the last of these is sufficiently
time consuming and storage intensive as to be unfeasible. They also consider the possi-
bility of partitioning the data into indivisible units of two or more observations each and
allowing only queries that operate on unions of the units, rather than on arbitrary sets of
observations.
The Microdata Analysis System will allow the U.S. Census Bureau to provide a
controlled, cost-effective setting in which data users have access to more detailed and
accurate information than is currently available in our public use microdata files. The
data accessible through the MAS can identify smaller geographic areas and show more
detail in certain variables where our public use files would be coarsened. Our goal for
the MAS is to allow access to as much high quality data as possible. An advantage of the
MAS is that it lessens the need for data to be released in less secure or more expensive
manners, such as those described in Weinberg et al. (2007). A predecessor of the MAS
is discussed in Rowland and Zayatz (2001).
Unlike the proposal in Schouten and Cigrang (2003), our plan is to make the MAS
available to anyone who wishes to use it. In a sense, the MAS will serve as a Research
Data Center for the entire public, although there will be restrictions in place that a
qualified researcher would not encounter at an established Research Data Center. The
MAS will allow access to data from demographic surveys and decennial censuses, with
the goal of eventually including economic survey and census data, as well as linked
datasets. We will initially make available regression analyses and cross-tabulations, with
other analyses to be added in the future. Currently, we intend to keep a record of all of
the queries entered into the system, but not the identities of the users making the queries.
Although the record will not directly affect the output that the system provides, it will
allow us to see how the system is being used. Our goal in doing this is to improve the
user experience and enhance the disclosure avoidance techniques if necessary.
Our current plan—as described in Chaudhry (2007)—is to offer the MAS through
the Census Bureau’s free DataFERRETT service with the intention that the system will
be used by people needing fairly simple statistical analyses: news media, some policy
makers, teachers, students, etc. The MAS has a graphical interface that allows users
to select variables of interest from a list. In the case of regression, variables can be
dragged into equations and, with a few clicks, users may create variable interactions
and transformations of selected variables. Some users may feel the need to use the
underlying confidential microdata for more exploratory data analysis, but it is not
apparent how to allow this within the MAS without violating confidentiality. These users
may find our public use files, when available, meet their needs if they account for the
decreased accuracy inherent in our disclosure avoidance procedures. Having a limited
range of allowable analyses is a weakness of the MAS, but, other than expanding the
number of off-the-shelf analyses the system offers, it is difficult to see how to remedy it.
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3. Overview of the MAS Confidentiality Rules
In 2005, the Census Bureau contracted with Synectics to develop an alpha prototype of
the MAS using the SAS language. We also contracted with Dr. Jerome Reiter of Duke
University to help in developing the confidentiality rules of the system and with Dr.
Stephen Roehrig of Carnegie Mellon University to help in testing these rules. Some rules
were developed and modified as a result of the testing. The beta prototype of the MAS
implements a Java interface within DataFERRETT, which submits requested analyses to
an R environment. We are using the publicly available data from the Current Population
Survey March 2008 Demographic Supplement to test the system.
The MAS software is programmed with several confidentiality rules and procedures
that uphold disclosure avoidance standards. The purpose of these rules and procedures is
to prevent data intruders from reconstructing the microdata records of individuals within
the underlying confidential data through submitting multiple queries. The confidentiality
rules discussed in this section are quite complex, and this discussion does not delve into
the complexities. More detail can be found in Lucero (2009, 2010a). All analyses are
subjected to two logical checks, referred to as the No Marginal 1 or 2 Rule and the
Universe Gamma Rule, which ensure that no query is answered if the universe is too
small or if the universe can be used to carry out differencing attacks by comparing
results of similar universes. Regression analyses are further subjected to restrictions on
the use of predictor and response variables. We plan to explore whether additional rules
are necessary for correlation coefficients.
3.1. Confidentiality Rules for Universe Formation
MAS users are allowed to run their statistical analyses on a universe, or sub-population,
of interest. Users are presented with a set of variables and category levels from which
they can define a universe using condition statements on the variables. For example, if
the user selects gender = 2( f emale) from the metadata, the universe is defined to be
the sub-population of all females. A slightly more complicated universe is gender =
1(male) ∨ employment status = 0(unemployed). One of the confidentiality rules re-
quires that all variables used to define universes must be categorical.
Since a user may want to define a universe based on variables that are not inherently
categorical (i.e., those that are continuous), raw numerical variables are presented to
the user as categorical recodes based on output of a separate binning routine. This
cutpoint program, outlined in Lucero et al. (2009b), creates bins of numerical values
and ensures a pre-specified minimum number of observations between any two cutpoint
values. Section 3.1.3 describes possible ways to generate cutpoints.
To define a universe using a numerical variable, a user is forced to choose from a
predetermined list of ranges the range that best meets her goal. For example, if a user
wished to run analysis on people with income = $46,000, the user would select the
metadata income = 4, which is the range ($45,000,$53,000] on the variable income
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Table 1: Table representation of the universe defined from (1) and (2).
income
gender $0 to $28,000 $28,000 to $39,000 $39,000 to $45,000 $45,000 to $53,000 Total
male n1,1 n1,2 n1,3 n1,4 n1,.
female n2,1 n2,2 n2,3 n2,4 n2,.
Total n.,1 n.,2 n.,3 n.,4 n.,.
and defines the universe as the sub-population of all individuals whose income is
between $45,000 and $53,000. Note that a user cannot define the universe to be the
range income = ($39,000,$46,000] unless $39,000 and $46,000 are among the pre-
determined cutpoints. The user must choose a range of values consistent with the
cutpoints that are given. This is a crucial restriction on what a user can do, since
allowing arbitrary universe formation on continuous data could lead to a differencing
attack disclosure, as described in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1. Confidentiality by Minimum Universe Size Requirements
To define a universe in the MAS, the user would first select m recoded variables from the
metadata, then select up to j bins for each of the m recoded variables. Universe formation
on the MAS is performed using an implicit table server. For example, suppose a data user
defines the universe as the union:
gender = female AND $45,000 < income≤ $53,000 (1)
OR
gender = male AND $28,000 < income≤ $45,000 (2)
This universe is represented as selected cells from a two-way table of counts for
gender and income, as shown in Table 1. Note that there are n2,4 + n1,2 + n1,3 total
observations in this universe. For convenience, we will use the notation U(n) to denote
a universe with n observations. In most cases, it should be clear from the context which
n observations lie in the universe. In this example, the universe defined as the union of
(1) and (2) will be referred to as U(n2,4 +n1,2 +n1,3).
In describing universes, we make a distinction between a simple universe and
a complex universe. A simple universe is one that can be described using variable
categories and the intersection set operator. A complex universe is constructed as the
union of multiple simple universes.
All universes formed on the MAS must pass two confidentiality rules: the No
Marginal 1 or 2 Rule and the Universe Gamma Rule. If a universe violates either of
these rules, the MAS will reject the universe query and prompt the user to modify
his selections. These rules are tested prior to performing the user’s selected statistical
analysis on the defined universe.
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The No Marginal 1 or 2 Rule requires that for a universe defined using m variables,
there may not be an m− 1 dimensional marginal total equal to 1 or 2 in the m-way
contingency table induced by the chosen variables. The universe U(n2,4 + n1,2 + n1,3)
passes the No Marginal 1 or 2 Rule if:
(ni,. ≥ 3 OR ni,. = 0, for i = 1,2) AND (n., j ≥ 3 OR n., j = 0, for j = 1, ...,4)
The Universe Gamma Rule requires that a universe must contain at least Γ observa-
tions; otherwise no statistical analysis will be performed. The value of Γ is not given
here since it is Census confidential.
The way this rule is checked is dependent on whether the universe is disjoint or
joint. A universe is classified as disjoint if its individual pieces do not share cell counts
in common. For example, pieces (1) and (2) for the universe U(n2,4 + n1,2 + n1,3) are
disjoint. Since U(n2,4 + n1,2 + n1,3) is a disjoint universe, the MAS would check that
piece (1) and piece (2) each contain at least Γ observations. Note that the cutpoint
bins of income are combined within piece (2) prior to performing the test; however,
bins representing different classes of an inherently categorical variable would not be
combined. In this case, since the n1,2 and n1,3 bins differ from each other only by a
cutpoint variable, they are combined, and the MAS checks:
n2,4 ≥ Γ AND (n1,2 +n1,3)≥ Γ
A universe is classified as joint if at least one of its individual pieces shares cell
counts in common with at least one other piece. For example, suppose the user defines
the universe U(n2,.+n1,3 +n1,4) = (3) OR (4), where (3) and (4) are given by
[gender = female] (3)
[$39,000 < income≤ $53,000] (4)
In this case, the observations in n2,3 and n2,4 — females with income in the interval
($39,000 , $53,000] — are included in both pieces (3) and (4). See Table 2. Since
U(n2,. + n1,3 + n1,4) is a joint universe, the Universe Gamma Rule would first check
that pieces (3) and (4) contain at least Γ observations, following the disjoint universe
scenario. Next, the intersection I = (3) ∩ (4) 6= {} would be checked to determine
that I contains at least Γ* observations, where Γ∗ ≤ Γ is another Census confidential
parameter. In this example, the MAS checks that the following inequalities are satisfied
before any results will be returned:
n2,. ≥ Γ AND (n.,3 +n.,4)≥ Γ AND (n2,3 +n2,4)≥ Γ∗
Once again, the cutpoint bins of income are first combined within piece (4) and within
I prior to the testing of the Universe Gamma Rule. In general, when a joint universe
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Table 2: Table representation of the universe defined from (1) and (2).
income
gender $0 to $28,000 $28,000 to $39,000 $39,000 to $45,000 $45,000 to $53,000 Total
male n1,1 n1,2 n1,3 n1,4 n1,.
female n2,1 n2,2 n2,3 n2,4 n2,.
Total n.,1 n.,2 n.,3 n.,4 n.,.
Tn ES1 ES2
G1 n1,1 n1,2
G2 n2,1 n2,2
−
Tn−1 ES1 ES2
G1 n1,1 n1,2−1
G2 n2,1 n2,2
=
T1 ES1 ES2
G1 0 1
G2 0 0
Figure 1: An Example of a Differencing Attack Disclosure.
is considered, all of the non-empty intersections of the pieces of the universe must be
checked to make sure they are sufficiently large.
3.1.2. Confidentiality by Random Record Removal
While the preceding rules provide some protection of the confidential data in the MAS,
they do not completely prevent differencing attack disclosures. A differencing attack
disclosure occurs when a data intruder attempts to reconstruct a confidential microdata
record by subtracting the statistical analysis results obtained through two queries on
similar universes. Suppose a data intruder first creates two universes on the MAS, U(n)
and U(n−1) (a proper subset of U(n)), where both contain the same n observations less
one unique observation, i.e., |U(n)\U(n−1)| = 1. The difference U(n)\U(n−1) = U(1)
is a manipulated universe that contains the single target observation. For illustration,
suppose a data intruder has prior knowledge of demographics in a small geographic
area, and in particular is aware of individuals, households or establishments with unique
characteristics within that area. It may be the case that there is only one non-citizen
among the n residents of the area. Then the intruder may create U(n) and U(n−1), where
U(n) is the full universe of people in the area and U(n−1) is the universe consisting of
citizens who live in the area. Suppose the data intruder then requests two separate cross-
tabulations for gender by employment status on these universes, Tn and Tn−1, as shown
in Figure 1. Since U(n) and U(n−1) differ by a unique observation, Tn−1 will be exactly
the same as Tn, less one unique cell count.
We may perform the matrix subtraction Tn−Tn−1 = T1, where T1 is a two-way table
of gender by employment status built upon the one unique observation contained in
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U(n)\U(n− 1) = U(1). As shown in Figure 1, T1 contains a cell count of 1 in the male
non-employed cell with zeros in the remaining cells, which tells the data intruder that
the one unique observation contained in U(1) is an unemployed male. By performing
differencing attacks similar to the one just described, a data intruder can successfully
rebuild the confidential microdata record for the one unique observation contained in
U(1).
A differencing attack may also be a concern if there are two observations within
an area that have a certain characteristic, particularly if the intruder is himself one of
these two. Suppose, for example, that the universe contains only two non-citizens, one
of whom is the intruder. The intruder could then construct the full universe U(n) and the
portion of the universe consisting solely of citizens U(n− 2). Since the intruder knows
his own personal characteristics, he may manually remove himself from U(n) to get
U(n− 1) and then perform a differencing attack as above by comparing U(n− 1) and
U(n−2) to obtain information on the other non-citizen in the area.
To help protect against differencing attacks, the MAS implements a universe sub-
sampling routine called the Drop q Rule. Traditionally, subsampling has usually been
used to estimate parameters when a population is too large to analyze in an efficient
manner and a (usually small) subset can give approximately the same results as the full
population. Our aims are very different here: the Drop q Rule is intended to remove just
enough observations from the dataset to thwart a differencing attack. In most cases, a
differencing attack performed while the Drop q Rule is in place will not lead to a mean-
ingful outcome, and even when it does, the intruder cannot be sure that the outcome
found is the correct one.
The Drop q Rule works as follows. A user-defined universe that passes all of the
previous rules has q records removed at random. To do this, the MAS will first draw
a random value of Qv = q1 ∈ {2, . . . ,k} from a discrete uniform distribution with
probability mass function P(Qv = q1) = 1k−1 . Then, given Qv = q1, the MAS will
subsample the universe U(n) by removing q1 records at random from U(n) to yield a
new subsampled universe U(n−q1).
Within the MAS, all statistical analyses are performed on the subsampled universe
U(n− q1) and not on the original universe U(n). Each unique universe U(n) that is
defined on the MAS will be subsampled independently according to the Drop q Rule.
To prevent an “averaging of results” attack, the MAS will produce only one subsampled
universe U(n−q1) for each unique universe U(n), with this unique subsample persisting
for the lifetime of the system. That is, all users who select a specific universe U(n)
will have all analyses performed on exactly the same subsampled universe U(n− q1).
To avoid obvious storage issues, the MAS accomplishes consistent subsampling of
universes by using the same random seed to perform the subsampling every time a given
universe comes up. To receive the full disclosure protection offered by the Drop q Rule,
it is necessary that the seed, while constant for a given universe, differs across universes,
and this can be implemented by having the seed be a function of the set of units in the
universe.
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The discrete uniform distribution is ideal for this purpose because of all distributions
on {2, . . . ,k}, it minimizes the probability that for two similar universes, the number of
observations dropped will be the same for both universes, which is a necessary condition
for an apparent disclosure to be made on a single observation.
Because each value used in the Drop q Rule is drawn from a discrete uniform
distribution, a data intruder attempting the difference attack Tn −Tn−1 = T1 may find
results inconsistent with forming two universes where U(n−1)⊂ U(n), as shown in
Figure 2. The values of xi j are the random numbers giving the number of observations
dropped from each cell of U(n) in forming U(n−q1). Similarly, the values of yi j are the
number of observations dropped from each cell of U(n− 1) in forming U(n− 1− q2)
respectively. Hence:
∑
i
∑
j
xi j = q1,0≤ xi j ≤ q1
∑
i
∑
j
yi j = q2,0≤ yi j ≤ q2
Here, i and j index the rows and columns, respectively, of the contingency table, with the
obvious generalizations involving higher order multiple sums for higher-dimensional
data. The resulting table T? may yield a successful disclosure of gender = G1 (male)
AND employment status= ES2 (unemployed) for the one unique observation contained
in U(1), but it is much more likely to supply nonsense to the intruder. Coupled with
the difficulty of finding candidate differencing attack universes, data intruders will find
their time better spent elsewhere. Section 4 contains a brief overview of the effectiveness
of the Drop q Rule against differencing attack disclosures. The rule is a crucial part
of our disclosure prevention strategy. The contracted work described by Roehrig et al.
(2008) found several instances in which a prototype version of the MAS lacking this rule
was susceptible to differencing attacks, not just in theory but also in practice. However,
their approach was to run a large number of tabulation queries and search for universes
that were almost the same. This method could be partly deterred by slowing down the
system, requiring a wait time between each user query.
Tn−q1 ES1 ES2
G1 n1,1− x1,1 n1,2− x1,2
G2 n2,1− x2,1 n2,2− x2,2
−
Tn−1−q2 ES1 ES2
G1 n1,1− y1,1 n1,2−1− y1,2
G2 n2,1− y2,1 n2,2− y2,2
=
T? ES1 ES2
G1 y1,1− x1,1 1+ y1,2− x1,2
G2 y2,1− x2,1 y2,2− x2,2
Figure 2: Differencing Attack Thwarted by the Drop q Rule.
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The Drop q Rule is a generalization of the previously used Drop 1 Rule and Drop 2
Rule, where a small and fixed number of observations were removed before analysis.
These rules led to tables that were susceptible to differencing attacks. One notable
vulnerability could be exploited by starting, as usual, with two universes U(n) and
U(n− 1), identical with the exception of one unit, with the intention of performing a
differencing attack. For example, an intruder might know that a certain geographical
region contains exactly one Korean War veteran. The intruder could then consider the
universe of all people in that region, as compared to the universe of all non-Korean
War veterans in the region. However, instead of requesting a tabulation of these two
universes, the intruder may augment each universe by adding to it the full population of
a non-overlapping geographical region of size N >> n, such as a large state that does not
contain the original region. Then a three-way tabulation could be done of veteran status
versus state versus the variable that the intruder wishes to disclose for the augmented
universes U(n+N) and U(n−1+N). In the case of the Drop 2 Rule, it is overwhelmingly
likely that all four of the dropped observations will be in the large region of size N, thus
leaving the portions of the provided tables representing the original region of interest
unmodified. We are currently examining other disclosure rules to prevent this sort of
“padding” attack.
A differencing attack leads to a correct inference when the difference between the
two matrices represented by the modified tables contains a 1 in the correct cell and 0s
in all other cells. In most cases, when the Drop q Rule is used, there are cells with both
positive and negative numbers, and no inference can be reached by the intruder. It is
also possible to obtain an apparent—but incorrect—inference, which occurs when the
difference is a table with a 1 in one cell and 0s in all of the others, but the 1 is not in the
correct cell.
3.1.3. Cutpoint Methods
The cutpoints used in universe formation in the MAS are generated by a separate pro-
gram. Various methods exist in the program, and each provides a different set of cut-
points, as influenced by the empirical distribution of a variable. The methods imple-
mented are fixed width, minimum width, increasing width, and partitioned binning. Cut-
points for each variable in the dataset can use a different strategy, but the final cutpoints
for a given variable are generated only once, after choosing an appropriate strategy.
What follows is a basic description of each strategy.
Fixed width binning ensures that all bins have the same width. This is implemented
as finding a constant ωFW , such as 10, so that the distance from the minimum value
to the maximum value of each bin will be ωFW . Because bin widths are constant, the
number of observations in each bin will vary, causing some bins to be sparsely populated
while others are dense. The fixed width is chosen to be the minimum value ωFW such
that all bins contain at least βFW observations, for some pre-determined value βFW . This
can make ωFW large, so that the resolution across dense areas of the data is too crude.
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Figure 3: Fixed and Minimum Width Binning on 1,000 N(0,1) random samples.
In data following a Gaussian distribution, the bin width will be determined by the tails
and the center bins will be quite dense.
Minimum width binning uses a value βMW and creates bins such that each has as
close to βMW observations as possible. Identical realizations of the variable will not be
split across multiple bins. For example, considering a numerical variable X with support
N, all observations with X = 5 will belong to the same bin regardless of the number
of observations with X = 5. This approach tends to generate bins of smaller width than
other approaches, since it allows for finer resolution in dense areas of the data but allows
the bins to be much wider when covering sparse data in order to include at least βMW
observations.
Increasing width binning may be viewed as a compromise between fixed and
minimum width binning. Increasing width binning starts with a fixed bin width, ωIW ,
which gradually increases as the value of the variable increases. This corrects the
problem in fixed width binning of bins tending to be large, while also allowing for a
consistent bin width, which one does not get in minimum width binning. Considering
income data, ωIW might equal 25,000 at X = 0, but when the cutpoint reaches X =
100,000, ωIW may jump to 150,000 as a way to deal with sparser data in the tails.
For sufficiently large X , we obtain a value of ωIW = ∞ once the number of remaining
observations approaches some value α< 2βIW .
The previous binning methods are all referred to as bottom-up methods since they
begin with some width value and starting point in the data and build bins from there.
Alternatively, partitioned binning is a top-down binning strategy in that it uses the data
as a whole in creating bins. Partitioned binning begins by sorting the data and then splits
the set into two subsets containing approximately the same number of observations.
These two subsets are themselves each split into two smaller subsets in the same fashion.
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Table 3: Bins created on the dataset {1,1,2,2,4,4,5,6}.
Method Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4
Fixed W. 1-2 3-4 5-6 NA
Min. W. 1-1 2-2 4-4 5-6
Inc. W. 1-2 3-6 NA NA
Partitioned 1-1 2-2 4-4 5-6
[1−6]
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Figure 4: Partitioned Binning on dataset {1,1,2,2,4,4,5,6}.
This process continues as long as there are at least βPW observations in each bin. The
final result is a binary tree of bins of unequal width.
As a quick example of how each method performs on the same data, consider a
dataset 1,1,2,2,4,4,5,6. Table 3 shows the cutpoints, or boundaries, for each bin that the
different algorithms will create. Assume that the minimum number of elements in each
bin is βMIN = 2.
The binary tree for the partitioned binning is shown in Figure 4. A user may choose
pieces for the universe using any node shown in the diagram.
Each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, so which performs best on
a given variable depends both on the variable’s support and distribution and on the
properties desired by the user. However, none of the methods considers the underlying
distribution of a variable in building the bins, so there is a necessity to analyze the
performance of a chosen method. Consider how each would perform on a Gaussian
distribution. Fixed width binning may not provide the resolution desired around the
mean, and increasing width binning is primarily useful when the probability density
function of the variable in question is decreasing over most of the range of the variable.
Partitioned and minimum width binning will produce similar results, but the cutpoints
in the minimum width and partitioned approaches may provide binning so fine that the
exact values for some records are at risk.
3.2. Confidentiality Rules for Regression Models
The MAS implements a series of confidentiality rules for regression models, in addition
to the universe restrictions already mentioned. For example, users may only select
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up to 20 independent variables for any single regression equation. Users are allowed to
transform numerical variables only, and they must select their transformations from a
pre-approved list. This prevents the user from performing transformations that deliber-
ately overemphasize individual observations such as outliers. Currently, the allowable
transformations are square, square root and natural logarithm.
Any fully interacted regression model that contains only dummy variables as pre-
dictors poses a significant potential disclosure risk, as described in Reznek (2003) and
Reznek and Riggs (2004). Therefore, users are allowed to include only two-way and
three-way interaction terms within any specified regression model, and no fully inter-
acted models are allowed. Furthermore, a two-way interaction is allowed only if both
of the interacted variables appear by themselves in the model, and a three-way interac-
tion is allowed only if all three variables appear uninteracted in the model and each of
the three associated two-way interactions appears. However, interactions do not count
against the 20-variable limit (so that, for example, if a model includes two predictor vari-
ables and their interaction, this is considered two variables, not three, for the purpose
of the limit). Categorical predictor variables are included in the model through the use
of dummy variables for all categories except one reference category. The MAS uses the
most common category as the reference category. In addition, each predictor dummy
variable must represent a category containing a certain minimum number of observa-
tions; if this minimum is not met, the dummy variable is omitted from the model. In
effect, this means that very sparse categories are absorbed into the reference category
level. The minimum allowable number of observations in a category is not given here
since it is Census confidential.
Prior to passing any regression output back to the user, the MAS also checks that R2
is not too close to 1. If R2 is too close to 1, then the MAS will suppress the output of
the regression analysis, as releasing the results of the regression would allow estimation
of the response variable with a high degree of accuracy if the values of the predictor
variables for any unit were known. It may also be the case that the regression does not
have an unreasonably high R2, but that there is a subset of units for whom the response
variable can be predicted unusually well given the predictor variables. Regressions with
this feature may also be suppressed. The system may also suppress instances where an
interaction term leads to a sparse combination of categories, as this may be a disclosure
risk. If all of these requirements are satisfied, then the MAS will pass the estimated
regression coefficients and the Analysis of Variance (or Deviance) table to the user
without restrictions (except for the absorption of categories mentioned above). If the
requirements are not satisfied, the system may attempt to absorb additional categories of
any categorical predictors into the reference category, as this may result in a regression
whose output is allowed to be released.
Sparks et al. (2008) propose some other confidentiality rules for regression, such
as using robust regression to lessen the influence of outliers, although at the moment
we still plan to use ordinary least squares regression when the response variable is
numerical.
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3.2.1. Synthetic Residual Plots
To determine whether the regression adequately describes the data, diagnostics such as
residual plots are necessary. Actual residual values pose a potential disclosure risk, since
a data intruder can obtain the values of the dependent variable by simply adding the
residuals to the fitted values obtained from the regression model. Therefore, the MAS
does not pass the actual residual values back to the user. To help data users assess the fit
of their ordinary least squares regression models, diagnostic plots are based on synthetic
residuals and synthetic real values. These plots are designed to mimic the actual patterns
seen in the scatter plots of the real residuals versus the real fitted values, or of the real
residuals versus the values of the individual variables.
The first step in creating synthetic residual plots is to create the synthetic dataset in
such a way that the synthetic data mimic the actual data. Using the notation of Reiter
(2003), let xp be a variable in the collected dataset, for p = 1, . . . ,d. In the synthetic
dataset, xsp corresponds to the original xp variable, with the superscript s indicating the
use of a synthetic dataset. There are various methods to generate xsp, but this discussion
will follow the method described in Reiter (2003), both for creating synthetic data and
for creating synthetic residuals, and our exposition and notation here mostly follow his.
For categorical variables xp, xsp are generated from bootstrap sampling the collected
data. If some categories are sparsely populated, there is the potential for averaging
the synthetic residual values at the sparse category to disclose real residuals, but
otherwise this part of the algorithm poses negligible disclosure risk. One possible
approach to this problem is to suppress residuals for categories that are sufficiently
sparse. For continuous variables xp, the distribution of the variable is approximated non-
parametrically using a kernel density estimator, and then inverse-cdf sampling is used to
generate xsp from the approximate distribution. When Reiter’s method is used, there is
no one-to-one correspondence between real observations and synthetic observations, so
there need not be any particular relationship between the size of the actual dataset and
the size of the synthetic sample. This feature helps to protect outliers, as an outlier in the
original data may not appear in the synthetic plot or may appear more than once. In the
case of categorical predictor variables, we let the synthetic sample size equal the actual
sample size, while in the case of numerical predictor variables, we let the synthetic
sample size be the minimum of 5,000 and the actual sample size. This is because when
making the synthetic and actual sample sizes equal in the numerical case, we found
that the system was slow when dealing with large datasets, and that the vast majority
of the time that the analysis took was spent on creating the synthetic residual plots for
numerical variables.
A shortcoming of the method for creating synthetic continuous predictors is that
the kernel density estimator is not able to identify a probability mass at a single point,
but rather will assume that the probability density function should be high in the
neighborhood of that point. This should not invalidate the method, but it will affect the
distribution along the x-axis for a predictor variable such as income, for whom many
people have a true value of 0.
Jason Lucero, Michael Freiman, Lisa Singh, Jiashen You, Michael DePersio and Laura Zayatz 91
It should be noted that both of these methods for creating the synthetic data work
with one variable at a time, i.e., xsp are drawn marginally, not jointly, and thus no valid
analysis can be performed based on the joint distribution of the synthetic variables.
This is not currently a major concern, as it is not our intention to release synthetic data
through the MAS. However, this does impose a limitation on the range of diagnostics
that we can make available in the future based on synthetic variables generated using
this method.
The next step is to generate the standardized synthetic residuals tsp so that the
relationship between tsp and xsp at any point xskp in xsp is consistent with the relationship
between t and xp around point xskp. To accomplish this, we must make a different set
of synthetic residuals for each predictor variable. Note that xskp, if numerical, will not
necessarily be a value observed in continuous real data, but may be drawn with the
inverse-cdf method.
For each variable, the goal is to give the user something akin to a plot of the
standardized residuals of the full (possibly multiple) regression model versus the value
of xp. For a variable p and an index k, define
tskp = bkp + vkp +nkp
The first term gives the expected value of the standardized residual for any given
value of p; the second accounts for the variation of the actual standardized residuals
around their expected values (which may change depending on the value of xkp if
heteroscedasticity is present); and the third adds noise to further prevent disclosure.
To calculate the first term bkp, a generalized additive model (GAM) is built for t and
xp. The value bkp equals the value of the GAM curve at the point xskp and is used to
fit the values tskp to the general relationship of t and xp, ignoring for the moment the
variation of t around its local mean. Note that tsp will differ for every regression a user
requests, and that it is important that the GAM not be overfit. In extreme cases, an overfit
GAM can create some of the same disclosure risks as releasing a regression with a high
R2. There may be some difficulty in avoiding such an overfit in an automated setting.
For categorical variables, a GAM cannot be fit, and we set bkp = 0 because whenever
a regression including a categorical variable is performed, the mean residual among
observations with any particular level of that categorical variable is 0.
Next, tskp is shifted off the curve bkp by vkp, which represents the amount by which
the points in the real data around xskp deviate from the curve. For the case where xp is
numerical, we consider the real data standardized residual t j, where
j = arg mini|xskp− xip|
is the index of the unit in xp whose value is closest to xskp. Ties can be broken by selecting
randomly from all tied choices. Having found j, we compute vkp = t j−b jp where b jp is
the value obtained from the GAM at x jp. If xp is categorical, j is the index of a randomly
selected observation in the real data such that x jp = xskp, so we set vkp = t j, since b jp = 0.
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Finally, a noise term nkp ∼ N(0,σ) is added to tskp where, for each regression, σ
should remain constant so that there is not artificial heteroscedasticity in the synthetic
residuals. The same random seed should be used for all regressions using the same
dependent variable; if this were not done, there would be the possibility of running the
same or similar models a number of times and averaging the different results, creating a
disclosure risk. Careful selection of σ is important, as a value that is too small may not
provide enough protection against disclosure, while a value that is too large may cause
patterns that are of interest to a legitimate user to be dwarfed by random variation.
When all steps are complete, the system creates a scatterplot of the synthetic
residuals versus each numerical synthetic predictor variable, as well as a scatterplot of
the synthetic residuals against the fitted value, with a kernel smoother used to show the
general shape of the latter curve. To protect outliers, the scatterplot requires all synthetic
standardized residuals to be in the interval [-4,4], with values that would otherwise be
outside this range truncated appropriately.
Since categorical predictors do not lend themselves to scatterplots, the residual plots
for categorical variables are replaced by side-by-side boxplots. Sparks et al. (2008)
propose that numerical predictor variables be binned in a cutpoint-like fashion, and that
the bins be used to create categories for side-by-side boxplots, which can be returned to
the user instead of scatterplots, with Winsorization being performed to protect outliers.
Since this binning lowers the resolution with which we can see the variable along the
x-axis, Sparks et al. (2008) use it as a substitute for synthetic data.
We are beginning to implement regression diagnostics for logistic regressions in the
manner described in Reiter and Kohnen (2005).
4. Evaluation: Effectiveness of the Drop q Rule
What follows is a generalization of some results in Lucero et al. (2009a), although that
paper considered an earlier, less secure version of the Drop q Rule in which q was a
fixed value chosen in advance. We present only a brief overview of this evaluation here;
full details are in Lucero (2010b). Given a pair of similar universes, U(n) and U(n−1),
differing by only one unique observation, with n large, we consider the effectiveness of
the Drop q Rule in preventing contingency table differencing attack disclosures of the
form T1 = Tn−q1 −Tn−1−q2 , as was shown in Figure 2.
For this section, we will consider a contingency table giving the values of two
categorical variables, with the same setup as described in Section 3.1. To make the
notation somewhat less unwieldy, we denote the size of each cell in the contingency
table using a single subscript, as shown in Figure 5, instead of the double subscript used
previously. In the simplest case, the contingency table is 2×2 (two categories for each
of two variables), but it could conceivably be larger—including either more categories
for a particular variable or more variables, which would lead to more dimensions and
would require a more elaborate graphical representation.
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Tn ES1 ES2
G1 n1 n2
G2 n3 n4
Figure 5: Illustration of notation used in Section 4.
We also let Π= (Π1, . . . ,Π4) denote the proportions of observations within each of
the cells of Tn and let Ψ= (Ψ1, . . . ,Ψ4) denote the proportions within Tn−1. If n is large,
then Π ≈Ψ. Furthermore, let X denote the vector giving the number of observations
removed from each of the four cells when q1 observations are dropped from Tn to
produce Tn−q1 , and let Y denote the vector giving the number of observations removed
from each of the four cells when q2 observations are dropped from Tn−1 to produce
Tn−1−q2 . A correct disclosure will occur if and only if X = Y, and this may occur only
when q1 = q2.
Since sampling with replacement is very similar to sampling without replacement
when n is large, we can say that for a given q1 and q2, X is approximately a multinomial
random variable with size q1 and probabilities given by Π, and Y is approximately a
multinomial random variable with size q2 and probabilities given by Ψ. Substituting Π
for Ψ and performing some other manipulations gives a formula for the approximate
probability of disclosure for a given number of cells J, maximum number of cells
dropped k and vector Π= (Π1, . . . ,ΠJ):
ξJ,k (Π1, . . . ,ΠJ) =
k
∑
q1=2
x1+...+xJ=q1∑
x1,...,xJ≥0
(
1
k−1
)2( q1!
x1! · . . . · xJ!
)2
Π2x11 · . . . ·Π
2xJ
J (5)
This formula has a total of
(J+k
J
)
− (J+1) summands within a rather involved summa-
tion, which makes it cumbersome, but it may be useful in assessing the risk involved
with releasing a given table with a given value of k. Further research may focus on
finding simpler approximations for the value in this sum.
A large number of differencing attacks were simulated, as described in
Lucero (2010b), for a pair of tables, differing by one observation, with n = 978 and
k ∈ {3,4,5,6,7}. The data were from the Current Population Survey March 2000 De-
mographic Supplement. The simulation led to the conclusion that the summation in (5)
generally agrees with the empirical probability of a disclosure to two decimal places for
this sample size.
It may also be desirable to find bounds on the summation in (5) in the case in which
Π is not known. This would be useful, for example, if we were looking at the same table,
but for a number of different universes. The derivation of bounds makes use of the fact
that the function in (5) is a Schur-convex function of Π; for more on Schur-convex
functions, see Marshall and Olkin (1979) or Lucero (2010b). The Schur-convexity
allows us to identify the most extreme cases, and leads to the following bounds:
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(
1
k−1
)2 k
∑
q1=2
x1+...+xJ=q1∑
x1,...,xJ≥0
(
q1!
x1! · . . . · xJ!
)2(1
J
)2q1
≤ ξJ,k (Π1, . . . ,ΠJ)≤
1
k−1 (6)
The righthand portion of inequality (6) says that the probability of an accurate disclosure
is at most the probability that the same value of q will be chosen for each of the two
tables. The lefthand portion gives a best case for the probability of disclosure, upon
which we cannot improve without modifying which cells are in the table or changing
k (with the proviso that all probabilities are approximate). In particular, the best case is
that all cells of the table include exactly the same proportion of the population, i.e. that
Π=
( 1
J , . . . ,
1
J
)
.
5. Other Approaches
Since the idea of a remote access system has been in existence for several years, a
number of approaches have been proposed that differ from ours to varying degrees, and
we survey some of them here.
Schouten and Cigrang (2003) present a variant of the idea of a remote access system,
which allows outstanding versatility, but is also difficult to create and expensive and la-
borious to maintain. Their proposed system allows users to submit queries by email,
written in any of several statistical programming languages. If a query is approved, the
user receives the results by email. Before the analysis is performed, an automated sys-
tem determines the legitimacy of the request, with particularly difficult cases handled
manually. As with the MAS, certain types of output are allowed and certain types are
not, but since the code is user-generated, rather than generated by the system behind
the scenes, it is challenging to identify all unallowable queries. This is especially true
because, as the authors emphasize, the validity of a query may depend on information
already released as a result of previous successful queries. The authors write, “Comput-
ers are simply not fast enough and the construction of a system that fully evaluates the
risk of disclosure may be too costly and complex and therefore not feasible.” Thus, in a
system like this, it may be necessary to perform some disclosure avoidance analysis on a
query after the result of the query has already been returned. This is not ideal, as a query
that is a disclosure threat might not be identified until its output has already been pro-
vided. However, such a method could be effective if the users are from large institutions
and have signed a contract describing their research and pledging to uphold confiden-
tiality. In this case, the fear of a user or institution’s jeopardizing its future access to the
data may serve as a sufficient deterrent to its deliberately submitting an invalid query.
In this type of system, a username and password would be necessary so that individual
users’ actions could be properly tracked.
Sparks et al. (2008) propose a system—Privacy-Preserving Analytics R©—that per-
forms a number of methods for disclosure avoidance, including keeping track of the re-
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gression models a user requests and ensuring that only a limited (although large) number
are run for each possible response variable. They also ensure that a user does not make
too many closely related requests.
Gomatam et al. (2005) make a distinction between static servers and dynamic
servers. A static server has a pre-determined set of queries to which it will provide an
answer. A dynamic server receives a query and makes a decision on whether to provide
an answer. A dynamic server—such as the one described in Schouten and Cigrang
(2003)—would keep a running record of all previously answered queries, and whenever
a new query was submitted, it would be compared against the list to determine whether
providing an answer would lead to a disclosure risk when the new answer was combined
with previously provided answers. A dynamic server has the highly undesirable property
that the order in which queries are submitted by the collective group of users plays a
large role in determining which queries are answered, and that eventually the server
reaches a point where no new queries can be answered. Since queries are answered
or rejected as they are received, the set of queries that are ultimately answered is not
the result of a careful assessment of which analyses would provide the most utility to
legitimate researchers while keeping disclosure risk at an acceptable level. Gomatam
et al. (2005) write that “[w]hether dynamic servers are possible remains an open
question.” The MAS is at its heart a static server, since it operates under a set of rules
that do not depend on previous queries. However, it operates in a dynamic fashion, since
the rules are checked for each new query that is submitted, rather than comparing it to
a pre-computed list, as creating such a list would be prohibitive. In a way, the MAS
does not fit into the framework of Gomatam et al. (2005), as it sometimes will provide
regression output that is less detailed than the user might have liked instead of refusing
output altogether.
Another approach to protecting privacy from a query-accepting statistical database is
to suppress from any tables any cells that are deemed a disclosure risk, either directly or
indirectly. Adam and Worthmann (1989) discuss this possibility and note that in certain
systems, cell suppression is not a feasible solution to the disclosure problem.
6. Future Work
The MAS will continue to be developed within DataFERRETT. We will soon be testing
the software itself and the confidentiality rules within the MAS beta prototype to
ensure that they properly uphold disclosure avoidance standards. We will draft a set of
confidentiality rules for cross-tabulations, and add different types of statistical analyses
within the system. We will explore other types of differencing attack disclosures, and
investigate ways to prevent such differencing attacks. Also of potential interest is doing
more theoretical explorations to evaluate disclosure risk. For example, it would be of
interest to determine the probability of a correct disclosure given that there is an apparent
disclosure resulting from a differencing attack. If this number were small enough, it
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could lead to a higher level of protection for the system, as an intruder would not be
able to be highly confident of the correctness of an apparent disclosure.
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